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them.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether greater regional autonomy, and the
ensuing opportunities for competition among regional governments, can promote
economic reform in Russia. This issue is relevant for several reasons. First, the
diversity of economic conditions across Russia suggests that the optimal time path of
economic transformation may vary across regions. Second, it would be difficult to
define, a priori, a model to be followed. Institutions in market economies are far from
uniform, having evolved over long periods of time in response to specific national
conditions. Competition among regions may help to discover institutional innovations
that are particularly appropriate under the given circumstances. Third, the ability of
national political institutions in Russia to ensure implementation of their decisions has
been seriously weakened. At the same time, regional governments have de facto
taken over important responsibilities in many areas of economic policy.
2. This paper starts by reviewing the most prominent theoretical approaches to the issue
of competition among jurisdictions. The fiscal federalism literature finds benefits from
decentralization mainly in the optimal provision of regional public goods. At the same
time, many contributions point out possible distortionary effects of inte'r-jurisdictional
competition on the allocation of public goods unless regional governments rely
exclusively on benefit taxation for their income. By contrast, the more recent
"Leviathan" literature emphasizes the disciplinary role of inter-regional factor
movements on bureaucrats who are likely to pursue their own agendas rather than the
common good. Finally, inter-jurisdictional competition may also be viewed in the
Hayekian sense as a discovery procedure that makes it possible to obtain information
that would otherwise remain unknown. •
3. We then review the role of regions in the economic transformation of Russia since
early 1992. The continuing conflict between the government and parliament over
economic policy has led to wide-spread uncertainty about which legal rules are in force
in many crucial areas. The ensuing institutional anarchy has particularly affected the
intergovernmental relationships. Since early 1992 the national government has also
pushed down responsibility for a variety of expenditures such as consumer price
subsidies, certain social security payments, airports, utilities, and housing for military
personnel to oblast level governments, without providing for compensation in the form
of increased transfers. Thus regional governments have acted as a buffer between the
majority of the population caught in the economic relationships and the habits of
thinking of the old system, and the often unpredictable developments in Moscow, and
have helped to stabilize the evolution of events during a time of severe economic,
social, and political upheaval. In doing so, however, they relied mainly on defensive
strategies to protect regional interests, and used command methods familiar from the
old system. Without clearly defined rights and obligations, they were by and large
unable to actively promote economic reforms that had become stuck at the national
level. This raises the question of whether, under more favourable circumstances, the
regions in Russia could play a more active role in economic transformation.
4. We then undertake an empirical analysis of the determinants of inter-regional
differences in preferences regarding political and economic reform. Some studies
suggest that there exists a North-South divide in political preferences along the lines of
resource-rich vs. industrial rustbelt regions. If this is true, the economic case for
decentralization in Russia would be weakened to the extent to which economic reform
is sought as a vehicle for income redistribution, rather than as a means for satisfying
diverging preferences for the provision of particular public goods. Our empiricalanalysis indicates that agricultural areas (i.e. regions with high per capita output of
important agricultural commodities) tend to be more conservative, while areas with
high per capita household income in 1991 tend to be more supportive of reform
(ceteris paribus). A priori, agricultural areas would not be expected to suffer relatively
strongly as a result of economic reform, while pre-reform household income need not
be a good predictor of post-reform per capita income. Hence we conclude that,
although the presence of distributional concerns cannot be discarded, the regional
variations in support for economic and political reform also reflect different "genuine"
political preferences.
5. The potential benefits of decentralization and inter-regional competition in Russia are
thus straight-forward: Diverging regional preferences regarding economic reform
indicate that decentralization of the relevant decision-making powers would improve
the welfare of regional populations. Similarly, widely different local conditions suggest
that the optimal time paths of economic transformation may differ across regions, and
inter-jurisdictional competition may help to detect locally appropriate solutions. Finally,
effective democratic control of governments is not yet well-established in Russia.
Therefore any effective controls on the behaviour of government'bureaucrats, such as
factor migration in the context of inter-jurisdictional competition, would be highly
welcome.
6. It is beyond the scope of this paper to devise a detailed blueprint for future
intergovernmental relations in Russia. Our discussion of the limitations of inter-regional
competition in Russia leads us to draw three main lessons, however. First, the
effectiveness of inter-regional competition will depend on a constitutional framework
that can only be provided by the central political institution. This should include not only
basic human rights, but also economic rights such as the free movement of people,
goods, and money throughout Russia. In addition, there are also areas such as the
legal system and macroeconomic policy where inter-regional differences in
preferences are probably small, and which may therefore be delegated to the centre to
avoid duplication of effort.
7. Second, an economic case may be made for requiring all regions to share in the
financial burdens resulting from Russia's communist legacy. Apart from economic
considerations, there is also the possibility of political upheaval if powerful groups
stand to suffer excessive income losses. In all likelihood, burden-sharing will require a
substantial inter-regional redistribution of income that may well have to be organized
through the centre.
8. Third, an institutional framework should be created that takes into account the existing
inter-regional differences in political preferences and in the need for inter-regional
cooperation. It seems advisable, conceptually, to reconstruct the federal system from
bottom to top, and to allocate responsibilities to the centre only if this is in the interest
of a very large majority of regions. More limited inter-regional cooperation that involves
only sub-groups of regions may occur through specialized supra-regional, medium-
level government institutions that are controlled by the participating regions.1. Introduction
Even more than in other former planned economies, successful transformation of the
economic system in the Russian Federation involves a sea change in political and
economic institutions. A short, and far from exhaustive list includes the restructuring of
government budgets at the national, regional and municipal levels, the introduction of
financial discipline in enterprises and the financial system, and the ownership of the
means of production, the required changes are particularly far-reaching and difficult to
implement because Russia is practically without living memory of market-type relations
between economic agents.
This raises the question of whether such changes can be imposed from above, i.e. by the
central government (with the possible support of foreign economic advisors). At least
three objections come to mind. First, the diversity of economic conditions in the country
suggests that the time path of institutional change may vary across regions. Second, it
would be a hazardous task to define, a priori, the model to be followed. Institutions in
market economies are far from uniform, having evolved over long periods of time in
response to specific national conditions. Third, while Western attention so far has
focussed on the federal (central) institutions in Moscow, their ability to ensure that
decisions taken at the national level are implemented locally is now severely limited.
Arguably, therefore, the activities of regional (oblast-level) governments are at least of
equal importance for the ultimate success, or otherwise, of economic transformation in
Russia.
An alternative view of institutional change proceeds from the Hayekian notion of
institutions as spontaneous social inventions. This view suggests that, with appropriate
incentives, individual institutions will adjust to changes in their environments, and new
institutions will be created spontaneously when old ones turn out to be unreformable. The
implied process of trial and error can only be sustained in the presence of competition
among existing and newly created institutions. This view is particularly attractive in relation
to the present situation in Russia because it allows specific national circumstances to
influence institutional change and, additionally, permits regional diversity.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether greater regional autonomy, and the
ensuing opportunities for competition among regional governments, can promote
economic reform in Russia. The theoretical background is provided by the fiscal
federalism debate: First, economic transformation in Russia will lead to substantial shifts
in relative income positions, and thus to demands for protection and compensation.
Second, certain inevitable government expenditures have to be financed at the national
level (like the conversion of the defence sector), requiring a substantial fiscal burden to be
distributed among the regions. Therefore a strong constitutional framework may well beneeded to keep free rider problems in check and ensure that competition among regional
governments does not lead to the progressive impoverishment of disadvantaged regions.
This paper starts by reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on the benefits and
limitations of government decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition. (Section 2.).
Then the role is described that the regions have played so far in the economic
transformation of the Russian Federation (Section 3.). In the following two sections the
conclusions drawn from the survey of the literature in Section 2. are applied to the current
situation in the Russian Federation. First, an attempt is made to assess empirically the
extent to which interregional differences in popular support for reform stem from genuine
differences in political preferences, rather than from distributional concerns (Section 4.).
Second, the opportunities for, as well as limits to inter-regional competition in Russia are
discussed with a view to throwing some light on the appropriate constitutional framework,
and guiding principles for the assignment of functions to the various tiers of government.
(Section 5.). Several lessons are finally drawn from this discussion for the future re-
ordering of inter-governmental relations in Russia (Section 6.).
2. Decentralization of Government and Inter-Regional Competition: Benefits and
Limitations
The economic arguments in favour of decentralization derive mainly from two sources.
1
The first is the theory of fiscal federalism, for which the Musgravian distinction between
the allocation, stabilization, and distribution functions of government still provides a
suitable starting point. The conclusion of this literature is, briefly, that the macroeconomic
stabilization function should rest with the central government. Likewise, central
government has a leading role to play in the distribution function, partly because of the
potential mobility of the poor. There may, however, be an efficiency argument for some
local poor relief (Oates, 1991, p. 4). By contrast, preferences regarding the provision of
public goods are likely to differ across regions, particularly in countries as diverse as
Russia. Allocation decisions should therefore be taken by those regional units whose
citizens will benefit from a particular decision (Boss, 1993).
Hence benefits from decentralization are seen to stem mainly from the optimal allocation
of resources in the production of public goods when regional preferences differ. On the
other hand, a large number of contributions to the fiscal federalism literature point to
potentially large distortionary effects of inter-jurisdictional competition on the provision of
1 In a brief summary such as the present one it is obviously impossible to do full justice to the very
diversified literature that has sprung up particularly in recent years. The purpose ol this section is to
identify lessons which are reasonably robust to the precise formulation of the underlying assumptions,
and which may therefore be drawn upon in the present policy-oriented discussion.public goods.
2 Such findings (including whether there is over- or underprovision of public
goods) are highly sensitive to the underlying assumptions, especially regarding the tax
system. Nevertheless it may be concluded that unless there is pure benefit taxation,
competition among jurisdictions will be distortionary more often than not in welfare analytic
terms. Pure benefit taxation (such as a head tax), however, is a very restrictive and even
implausible assumption if regional authorities are to have any substantial responsibilities
and, therefore, financing needs (Musgrave, 1991).
The resulting bias of traditional welfare analysis against decentralization is challenged by
a more recent literature that emphasizes the disciplinary role of inter-jurisdictional
competition with respect to government activities. The central assumption is that
government bureaucrats tend to pursue their own agenda rather than the common good.
Empirical studies have shown that, under specific circumstances, budget-maximising
behaviour (or, perhaps, plain inefficiency) on the part otbureaucrats may be contained
through tight electoral control (Pommerehne, 1989). Frequently, however, direct
democracy such as through obligatory referenda may be infeasible or ineffective,
especially at levels of government above the municipality. Then the ability of mobile
factors of production to emigrate from a high-tax area may exert a similar disciplinary
effect. Bureaucrats would find their power to increase taxes and expenditures constrained
as the exit of mobile resources leads to a shrinking tax base. In representative
democracies, they might also run the risk of not being reelected by voters whose incomes
are diminished by the exit of mobile resources (Sinn, 1990).
A related point has been made in the Hayekian tradition by Vihanto (1992). He argues that
competition among regional governments may be viewed as a discovery procedure that is
likely to unearth information that would otherwise not be available. Hence the possible
distortionary effects of competition among jurisdictions (which are known, in principle at
least, or may be estimated) have to be weighed against the (a priori unknown) benefits
from making discoveries that would otherwise not be made.
The empirical evidence on the Leviathan hypothesis, i.e. the effectiveness of inter-
jurisdictional competition in containing the size of government expenditures, is mixed. The
studies reviewed in Pommerehne (1989) point to a clearly discernible relationship
between the institutional arrangements governing decision-making on taxes and
expenditures on the one hand, and the size of government and the cost of specific
government services on the other. The contrast here is between direct and representative
democracy, however, rather than between decentralized and centralized government.
Only if decentralized government implies more stringent control over bureaucrats by the
Recent contributions include Oates and Schwab (1988), Taylor (1992), and several papers reviewed by
Wildasin and Wilson (1991).electorate may Pommerehne's findings be interpreted as supporting the Leviathan
hypothesis. Similarly, Oates (1991) concludes a survey of empirical studies by suggesting
that the degree of centralization has only a weak impact, at best, on the size of
government. Measures other than decentralization should be sought if one's objective is to
contain the size of government. Jansen (1991) undertakes an extensive econometric
analysis of the determinants of local government spending in the U.S. and finds that, after
accounting for a variety of conceptual and statistical problems, the evidence in favour of
the Leviathan hypothesis is rather weak.
This brief survey is sufficient to demonstrate that the costs and benefits of decentralization
depend on the circumstances of each country. Judging the desirability, or otherwise, of
inter-regional competition therefore presupposes empirical study. Because of the great
importance of distributional issues, the conclusions may also depend crucially on value
judgements.
3. The Position of Regions in the Economic Transformation of Russia
The transformation of former planned economies requires policy measures in the areas of
macroeconomic stabilization, economic restructuring and institutional change (Siebert,
1991). The optimal timing and sequencing of reforms in these three areas has been
extensively discussed under the heading of gradualism vs. shock therapy. By now a
majority view appears to have emerged that, on the one hand, the interdependence of the
issues requires the simultaneous adoption of policy measures in all three areas. On the
other hand, the weakness of existing institutions and the lack of administrative capacity
especially in the former Soviet Union make it imperative to concentrate on a limited
number of reform projects at any given time. The upshot of these arguments is the
"minimum bang" strategy (Williamson 1992). It implies that right from the start of reform, a
"critical" mass of changes should be introduced that is at the same time large enough to
be consistent and credible, and still sufficiently small to be feasible in the face of limited
administrative capacity (Lucke 1993a).
The policy of the Russian political leadership since the beginning of 1992 has differed
substantially from this prescription.
3 At the national level, attempts at macroeconomic
stabilization have been thwarted by the failure of government and parliament to agree on
a strategy for consolidating the federal budget. Structural adjustments have been
hampered by the unwillingness of the political leadership to allow domestic relative prices
to adjust fully to the world market relationships. Energy prices in particular are still
controlled and remain far below the world market level, in spite of the January 1992
Brief descriptions of developments in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union may be found in
DIW et al, various issues."general" price liberalization and the nominal liberalization of coal and oil prices in the first
half of 1993.
In the area of institutional reform some progress has been made with privatization in
services and industry. Nominal changes in ownership alone, however, will not transform
socialist enterprises into capitalist firms. It is of crucial importance to eliminate,
simultaneously, the lack of financial discipline, sometimes termed the "soft budget
constraint", which characterized enterprise behaviour under the old system (Kornai,
1993).
4 The required changes in the financial and legal systems, however, have not been
introduced. In sum, while the traditional system of intermediation is clearly gone for good,
attempts at economic reform have become bogged down due to the inability of the
government and parliament to agree on, and implement a consistent programme for
market-oriented reform.
The continuing conflict between the government and parliament over economic policy has
led to wide-spread uncertainty about which legal rules are in force in many crucial areas.
The relationship between the central and regional (oblast-level) governments has been a
particularly prominent victim of the ensuing institutional anarchy. During Soviet times, the
regions within the Russian Federation were de facto little more than administrative units,
independent of their legal status as autonomous republics, krais, or oblasts. Throughout
the former Soviet Union, a complicated system of direct and indirect inter-regional
transfers was used by the "centre" to channel savings into centrally directed investment,
and to ensure that regional standards of living did not diverge excessively (Oriowski, 1992;
1993). Details of the transfer system remained secret (and are still difficult to ascertain
today), and there was not even an open debate permitted about the system in general
terms.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has entailed the disintegration of the transfer system
among its former constituent republics. Direct (budgetary) transfers were terminated
immediately. Now the gradual adjustment of relative prices in inter-state trade to world
market relationships is doing the same to indirect transfers, which occurred mainly
through underpriced energy exports from Russia.
Within Russia, the traditional transfer system through the central government has been
undermined by several separate developments. For a number of years now, increased
freedom of debate has enabled the populations of resource-rich areas particularly in
Siberia to demand (and go on strike for) restrictions on the implicit outflow of funds from
their areas, given their own miserable living conditions. Recently many regions have
The traditional system of interactions among economic agents is often referred to as central planning.
Naishul (1993) has pointed out that during the last two decades at least, the term "bureaucratic market"
is more appropriate to characterize the system of intermediation.8
obtained the right to an enlarged share of the revenue from the sale of local natural
resources. This is equivalent to giving regions a greater share of the resource rent.
5
Since early 1992, the national government has been pushing down responsibility for
several types of expenditure to oblast level governments without providing compensation
in the form of increased transfers. Such expenditures included not only consumer price
subsidies for some basic foodstuffs and cash payments to certain vulnerable groups, but
also capital investment projects of national importance such as airports, utilities, and
housing for military personnel (Wallich, 1992, p. 42). Local governments (which are in turn
funded largely by oblast-level budgets) have also had to take over many social services
previously provided by enterprises.
Saddled with new tasks but without the proper means to fulfil them, oblast-level
governments have increasingly defaulted on the transfer of locally collected taxes to the
central government. At present, these regions have only limited control over their tax
revenue. They have recently been allowed (within certain limits) to set the rate of the
regional portion of the corporate profit tax, which is of dubious value when enterprises are
frequently lossmaking or otherwise default on payments. They also receive fixed shares of
the revenue from the personal income tax, some excises, resource taxes, and other, less
important taxes over whose bases or rates they have no control. The federal government
continues to hold exclusive control, however, over several important taxes such as the
value added and export taxes (Wallich, 1992, p. 31; DiW et al., 1994, pp. 18ff.).
The relatively small size of many oblast-level units has entailed a need for cooperation
among regions, both in terms of coordinating policies (such as on intra-regional trade) and
jointly representing regional interests vis-a-vis the central government. Regional
governments responded to this need quickly by setting up regional associations almost
throughout the territory of the Russian Federation (Radvanyi, 1992; Jarygina,
Martschenko, 1993, pp. 217ft.). While the scope of the activities and the political clout of
these regional associations differ considerably, their spontaneous formation suggests that
regional governments are both aware of and willing to realize the benefits of cooperation.
6
This brief review of the role of regions in the economic development of Russia since early
1992 supports the view articulated by Schlogel (1994) that during a time of severe
In a related development, many regions enforced restrictions on extra-regional exports by local
enterprises when the inter-regional payments system broke down in early 1992 and both foodstuffs and
critical industrial inputs could often be obtained only through barter deals.
The experience of the Siberian Agreement illustrates both the opportunities for effective representation
of regional interests, and the pitfalls of excessive politicization (Hughes, 1993). In a sense, the "regional
associations" in Russia may be compared to new types of specialized, supra-regional institutions set up
in many Western countries to perform tasks not adequately dealt with either at the national or the local
level. These include e.g. public transport authorities in metropolitan areas, boards of education, and
bodies running specialized hospitals (cf. Oates, 1991).9
economic, social, and political upheaval, regional governments have played a crucial role
in stabilizing the evolution of events. They have provided a buffer between the majority of
the population caught in the economic relationships and the habits of thinking of the old
system, and the often unpredictable developments in Moscow. In providing stability,
however, many regional governments relied on defensive strategies to protect their
interests, and used command methods familiar from the old system. Without clearly
defined rights and obligations, they were by and large unable to actively promote
economic transformation at the regional level.
7
This raises the question of whether, in a reformed policy environment, regions can make a
more constructive contribution to economic transformation. Since many regional
administrations are dominated by unreformed cadres of the old regime, fundamental
reform may also be required at the level of the regional units themselves. This may
involve organizational reform to shake up established relationships among individual
bureaucrats, or even the redrawing of borders to form larger regions with clearer regional
identities. The following two sections enquire to what extent certain preconditions for
successful decentralization and inter-regional competition are satisfied, and establish
some general guidelines for the constitutional framework and assignment of functions to
the central vs. regional government.
4. Determinants of Popular Support for Economic and Political Reform
It has been pointed out in Section 2. that the concept of competition among jurisdictions
relies on the assumption that preferences for the provision of public goods vary across
jurisdictions. The results of several nation-wide elections and referenda in Russia since
1991 do indeed point to pronounced inter-regional differences in popular support for
market-oriented economic and political reforms. Several studies conclude, however, that
such support is mainly a function of regional economic structures that determine how
voters' incomes will be affected by reforms (Yasin et al., 1994). These studies suggest
that distributional concerns, rather than diverging preferences regarding public goods
such as the Wirtschaftsordnung (economic system) per se, dominate popular attitudes
towards reform. If this hypothesis is true, the case for decentralization in Russia would be
weakened to the extent to which economic reform is sought as a vehicle for income
redistribution, rather than as a means for satisfying diverging preferences for the provision
of particular public goods. The purpose of this section is to undertake an empirical test of
7 One obvious exception is Nizhnii Novgorod oblast where a number of factors coincided to make the
oblast an experimenting ground for the potential for local economic reform (Cline, 1994). The attempts
made by the central government to formalize relationships with the regions through the Federation
Treaties signed in early 1992 are reviewed by DIW et al. (1993) and Shaw (1992).10
the relative importance of genuine diverging political preferences vs. distributional
concerns in determining attitudes towards reform.
To this end, it is necessary, first, to measure popular support for reform in individual
regions. All in all, seven indicators are employed in the analysis, and are presented in
Appendix Table A1. Emphasis is placed on the results of the Spring 1993 referendum on
whether people supported ('reformist') President Yeltsin personally (YEL93), or the
('reformist') economic and social policies of the government at the time (ECSO93), or
whether they supported early elections to replace the ('reformist') president (ELPR93), or
to replace the ('conservative') parliament (ELPA93). Information is available on actual
regional percentage shares of "yes" votes on each of these question (Yasin et al., 1994,
Annex 1). By contrast, the results of the December 1993 election for the parliament, and
for the referendum on the new constitution have yet to be published in full (RFE/RL News
Briefs, 21 .-25.2.94). The only available source of information is newspaper reports with
maps of Russia containing the information represented by the (dichotomous) DEMOCRD
and CONSTID variables. DEMOCRD takes the value of 1 if pro-reform, or "democratic"
parties (VR, RDDR, Yabloko, PRES) obtained more votes than conservative groups
(LDPR, KPRF, Agrarian Party RF). CONSTID is set to 1 if more than half the votes cast
were in favour of the new constitution. LLYEL represents analysts' judgements on where
support for Yeltsin has been weakest from 1991 through 1993 (and is equal to 1 for all
other areas).
The large number of possible indicators raises the question to what extent they are
correlated with one another, i.e., whether they tend to identify similar sets of regions as
supportive of, or opposed to reform. In order to analyse the degree of interdependence,
correlation or contingency coefficients have been calculated for each pair of indicators,
depending on whether at least one in a given pair is categorical. Generally speaking,
correlation among these variables is found to be high but less than perfect. By using a
variety of indicators, this empirical analysis seeks to put into perspective the difficulties
that may be involved in the interpretation of results for any one variable.
These indicators of regional support for reform are employed as dependent variables in
regression and probit analyses, depending on whether each dependent variable is
dichotomous or not. The explanatory variables in these analyses have been chosen to
reflect both possible distributional concerns, and regional characteristics that may be
related to.diverging preferences for public goods.
It is assumed, in line with the studies previously cited, that distributional concerns are
related to the structure of regional output: Regional electorates are suspected to be more
or less supportive of economic and political reform depending on how their predominant
sources of income are likely to be affected. For example, regions which depend on heavy
industry for a large share of their employment are suspected to be less favourably inclined11
towards reform, ceteris paribus, because many enterprises may no longer be viable once
economic reform has lead to the adjustment of relative input prices to world market levels.
While'it would have been desirable to use sectoral shares in regional value added, this
was impossible because, due to still widespread price distortions, no meaningful data are
available.
8 The number of explanatory variables that was subsequently chosen to describe
regional production structures (cf. Tables A2 through A4) would have been too large to
allow meaningful regressions to be run. Therefore, factor analysis has been applied to the
variables representing each of the three sectors (agriculture, raw materials, industry). In
this way it has been possible to condense the information contained in each subset of
data into a manageable number of explanatory variables (factors), each with an economic
interpretation.
The three explanatory variables listed in Table A5 are supposed to represent political
preferences not directly linked to distributional concerns.
9 DNATtakes the value of 1 if a
region enjoys autonomous status (republic, oblast, or okrug) because of the presence of a
significant non-Russian population. Autonomous regions are generally thought to have
benefited from greater independence due to political reform. URBPOP represents the
degree of urbanization measured as the percentage of the population residing in urban-
type settlements according to the traditional Soviet definition. Almost universally, urban
people tend to be less conservative than rural populations. PCAPY is per capita 'money'
(i.e., household) income of the population in 1991.
It is plausible to assume that economic restructuring, which had not started in earnest in
1991, will entail a substantial redistribution of incomes. If this is true, 1991 income per
head may not be a reliable predictor of future, post-reform income. Instead, it may be
thought of as proxying factors such as educational attainment, political awareness, etc.
The results of the OLS regression and probit analyses are reported in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively. Each dependent variable is regressed first on the indicators of regional
production structures, then on the variables representing possible determinants of
'genuine' political preferences, and finally on all explanatory variables. This procedure
gives an impression of the explanatory value of each group of variables. In the case of the
referendum results (Table 1), the low values of the Durbin-Watson statistic for the
regressions with only a subset of explanatory variables suggest a possible specification
8 The data that were used are reproduced in full in Appendix Tables A2 through A4. Table A2 lists the
output per head of the population of various agricultural commodities. Table A3 reports on the regional
dispersion of the more important raw materials, with information on the existence of enterprises
substituting for actual output figures whenever the latter are unavailable. Table A4 lists employment in
some important branches of industry as well as the "non-productive" (tertiary) sector relative to total
population.
9 In addition to the explanatory variables, Table A5 lists the total population of each region.12
problem. Observations are arranged by "economic (macro) regions" as traditionally
defined, each comprising between five and fifteen oblast-level regional units. Hence a low
DW value indicates that residuals tend to be either positive or negative in each macro
region. This specification problem is apparently alleviated when all explanatory variables
are included. The latter regressions also have substantially higher coefficients of
determination. Of the seven dependent variables, only ELPA93 (support for early elections
for the parliament) shows little relationship with the independent variables with a
coefficient of determination of .16. The estimates with ELPR93 as the dependent variable
(where a high percentage indicates disapproval of reform) are practically a mirror image of
the estimates for YEL93 and ECSO93.
Without going into the fine points of particular regression results, three important
determinants of support for reform may be identified. First, regions with high per capita
household incomes in 1991 tended to support reforms, ceteris paribus. Second, regions
with substantial agricultural output (particularly animal products and cereals) or large
employment in the food industry tended to be more conservative. Third, regions with
substantial deposits of precious metals and similar natural resources (PREMET: gold and
diamonds; ARGTIT: silver and titanium) were also more conservative, ceteris paribus.
Remarkably, the remaining independent variables do not have a clearly identifiable impact
on regional support for economic reform. This applies not only to the legal status of
regions (autonomous area or not), but also to their dependence on employment in the
main branches of civilian and military industry, and to the local availability of mineral raw
materials except precious metals. Hence our empirical findings provide no support for the
hypothesis (popularized, inter alia, by the Economist, 25 December 1993) that there exists
a North-South divide in political preferences in Russia along the lines of resource-rich vs.
industrial rustbelt regions. If there is a divide with well-defined regional groupings on either




These finding now need to be interpreted in terms of our distinction between distributional
concerns and diverging political preferences. It is doubtful whether the negative coefficient
of the agricultural variables indicates distributional concerns, because it is far from obvious
that agricultural areas would lose from market-oriented reforms. It seems more plausible
to interpret this finding in terms of diverging political preferences as indicating that rural
One might think of a cluster analysis as a way of identifying groups of regions with similar
characteristics. It was found in an earlier analysis of regional economic structures in the Russian
Federation, however, that the results of cluster analysis were quite sensitive to the essentially arbitrary
choice of the independent variables Lucke (1993). The purpose of that study was to identify regions
sufficiently different from the majority of areas to possibly benefit from separatism. While the choice of
independent variables or of the clustering method did not significantly affect the identification of such
outliers, it did have a marked impact on the grouping of the other regions.13
people are more conservative. Similarly, people in resource-rich areas may no longer feel
a need for change now that their relative income situation has improved considerably.
The interpretation of the positive coefficient of per capital household income is more
complicated. Onjhe one hand, as suggested above, people in high-income areas may be
more fully aware of the inevitability of reform, independent of how it is likely to affect them.
On the other hand, they might view transition to a market economy as an opportunity to
improve their incomes and living conditions generally. They might also believe that
existing inter-regional income differences will widen if redistribution through the centre is
weakened by economic and political reform. Equation (13) in Table (1) demonstrates that
per capita income is positively correlated with the presence of sectors whose prospects
are relatively good, such as precious metals, oil and gas, silver and titanium, and food
processing. By contrast, there is a negative correlation with heavy industry where there is
usually thought to be a great need for restructuring. Hence, while our findings point to the
presence of substantial differences in "genuine" political preferences, the possibility
cannot be discarded that PCAPYalso reflects, to some extent, distributional concerns.
1
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5. Guidelines for a Constitutional Framework and Assignment of Government
Functions
We now draw on these empirical findings and the discussion in Section 2. to discuss the
future contribution of decentralization to economic transformation in the Russian
Federation. We first look at the potential benefits, and then address some of the possible
pitfalls. On the basis of this discussion, we shall formulate some guiding principles for a
constitutional framework for inter-regional competition, and for the assignment of functions
to the central vs. regional governments.
The empirical analysis in Section 4. has emphasized the wide inter-regional diversity of
preferences for political and economic reform. The inability of national political institutions
to implement a coherent economic policy may also be interpreted as a reflection of
irreconcilable differences between the sectoral and regional interests that each institution
represents. Decentralization would give individual regions considerable leeway in
choosing their owns paths for structural adjustment and institutional reform, such as
privatization. Hence it would permit the provision of public goods in the form of rules for
adjustment to conform more closely to the wishes of regional electorates. This argument
is in line with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism.
Because of the wide differences in local conditions it would probably be difficult, if not
impossible, to devise optimal transformation strategies from the centre. Hence the
Closer analysis of the regression results does not suggest that the findings are due to multicollinearity
involving PCAPYand the remaining explanatory variables.14
formulation of policies for transformation may benefit from the availability of local
information that can only be obtained through the process of search and discovery
initiated by inter-regional competition. This is the Hayekian argument as applied by
Vihanto(1992).
A new political culture in Russia is still evolving, and it is certainly to early to state that
{even representative) democracy has taken firm roots at the central as well as the regional
level. Hence it would be desirable if there existed some check on the behaviour of regional
governments in the absence of effective electoral control. Such a check could be provided
by inter-jurisdictional competition if the cost of migration of factors of production were
sufficiently low. This is a variant of the Leviathan argument.
Our review of theoretical approaches to inter-jurisdictional competition earlier in this
section also suggests a number of qualifications on any overly optimistic view of the net
benefits of decentralization in Russia. These qualifications center around the questions of
first, how large are the distortions produced by inter-regional competition, and second, are
the necessary conditions for effective inter-regional competition satisfied. After discussing
each qualification, we suggest its possible implications for the future relationship between
central and regional governments in Russia.
The first qualification stems from the importance of distributional issues. Much of the
increase in regional power that has occurred so far has been driven by discontent with the
traditional system of explicit and implicit inter-regional transfers. However, starting
conditions differ substantially across regions. The legacy of the old economic and political
system frequently includes not only distorted structures of regional output, but also serious
ecological damage, or concentrations of military units in particular areas. On the positive
side, resource-rich regions still benefit from centrally directed investment in the past.
Without substantial redistribution, conditions of life would therefore differ substantially
across regions while it would be beyond the power of many regional governments to
improve local conditions significantly. Such income differences would be unjustified
economically as they would be the result of free-riding by particular regions on a common
financial burden. Hence they would probably be unacceptable politically if there were a
large number of relatively poor regions, or if powerful groups (such as the military) ended
up with incomes below the subsistence level. While theoretically the financial legacy of the
past could be distributed among the regions once and for all (cf. Dreze, 1993, pp. 279ff.),
this is not a practical option because many of the relevant costs are not yet known. The
implication of these arguments is that the Russian regions' common past will necessitate a
significant degree of income redistribution for the foreseeable future.
1
2 Should individual
The recent literature shows that redistribution does not depend on the existence of a central institution
(Thomas, 1993). It may also be organized through agreement among rationally acting regional
governments. The mechanism is essentially migration, coupled with the cost of overcrowding in15
high-income regions wish to leave the Russian Federation, an economic case may be
made for requiring them to compensate the remaining areas to the extent of their probable
future contributions.
The second qualification relates to the legal status of the constituent regions of the
Russian Federation. The essence of intergovernmental relations in a federation is that the
allocation of responsibilities to the centre vs. the regions is decided upon by a central
body, such as a constituent assembly. The upshot of this assumption is that citizens are
expected to identify, in the first place, with the country as a whole, and only then with a
particular region. If this is the case, inter-regional redistribution of incomes may be
organized on the presumption that people are prepared to pay for the creation of similar
living conditions throughout the country.
Although the present redistribution of incomes among regions in Russia proceeds along
these lines, it is not clear that such a consensus still exists. The persistent conflicts
between the Russian central government and a number of regions, particularly certain
autonomous republics, raise the question of whether Russia should not rather be thought
of as a confederation. As such, it would consist of sovereign subjects that have freely
decided to delegate certain functions to the confederation, and would be free to decide to
leave the confederation should they find this to be in their best interest. Some observers
look upon that possibility as the beginning of the disintegration of Russia (e.g. Yasin et al.,
1994). Certainly it would not facilitate the definition of rules for the sharing of the common
financial burden from the past. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the central
government can hold on to responsibilities that a substantial number of regional
governments claim for themselves.
Independent of whether the status of Russia is formally changed to a confederation, it
may therefore be useful to allocate responsibilities to the centre only if the vast majority of
regions find this in their best interest. This is in line with the subsidiarity principle. At the
same time, a framework for supra-regional cooperation should be created that can be
used by groups of regional units according to their individual needs. The advantage of
such a scheme would be that allocating only limited responsibilities to the centre would
allow even regions with limited common interests to participate in the confederation. At the
same time, regions with a need for closer cooperation would be free to set up medium-
level governmental organizations that would cater to their greater needs for cooperation.
Such a reform should also provide for a uniform status of the regions because the
distinction between autonomous areas (with a significant non-Russian ethnic group) on
the one hand and oblasts and krais on the other is becoming obsolete. The cultural
identity of ethnic minorities may be protected more effectively by other means.
particularly attractive regions. Trie effectiveness of this mechanism in the Russian context is discussed
below.16
The third qualification relates to the preconditions for well-functioning competition among
jurisdictions. It is far from obvious that these are in place throughout Russia. The fear has
even been expressed that decentralization would ultimately lead to the disintegration of
Russia into fiefdoms (Yasin et al., 1994), where local warlords might not be inclined to
submit to democratic elections, and the cost of emigration for individuals might be
prohibitive.
1
3 In some parts of the North Caucasus such a situation may already be arising.
Given the large amounts of weaponry (conventional and other) left over from the Cold
War, this prospect seems rather undesirable. It is difficult to see how any institution other
than national legislative and jurisdictional bodies can guarantee the preconditions for
effective competition. These include, inter alia, an encompassing legal system,
guarantees for human rights, and especially the right to free inter-regional movement for
people, goods, and money.
1
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Finally, it may be noted that the human capital not engaged in rent-seeking types of
economic policy-making seems to be in short supply in Russia. In such cases it is
generally advisable to centralize decision-making in order to make the best possible use
of the available administrative capacity, rather than to spread it out thinly across regions.
1
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This observation strengthens the case for centralizing tasks where there would otherwise
be duplication of effort. These include especially national public goods such as defence,
diplomatic relations, macroeconomic management.
6. Conclusions
In sum, will far-reaching decentralization and competition among regional jurisdictions
promote economic transformation in Russia? The answer suggested by the above
arguments is cautiously affirmative. A return to a unitary state, or to a federation with only
very restricted powers for the regions, presently seems out of the question. It is hardly
conceivable that regional elites will give up the powers they have wrought from the centre
(and the rents that come with them). This should be true even if there were a conservative
1
3 The history of inter-war China provides a graphic example ol the type of "low-level equilibrium" that
might result.
1
4 Even then the cost of migration for people would probably still be so substantial (e.g. in terms of finding
new housing) that any distortionary impact of factor movements on the provision of public goods (which
arouses such concern in the public finance literature) would remain small in the short to medium term.
1
5 A similar point has been made by Levy (1988) who seeks to explain the relatively large size of exporting
footwear producers in South Korea compared with Taiwan. Levy argues that business, and particularly
international marketing skills were in relatively short supply in post-war Korea. Hence it was desirable to
have relatively large firms. The shortage of such specialized skills was arguably less stringent in Taiwan,
where firm size is found to have been significantly lower.17
backlash in national politics.
1
6 Further decentralization would give the more reform-minded
regions a chance to go ahead, and their example might well transpire to the presently
conservative regions. This assertion is supported by the empirical analysis in this paper
which has shown that inter-regional differences in support for reform reflect genuine
political preferences rather than merely distributional concerns.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail possible strategies for
decentralization in areas such as expenditure and tax assignment, privatization policy,
financial system reform, etc. This applies particularly because it is not clear whether
oblast-level regions will survive in their present form. In devising such strategies, however,
three lessons from the above discussion may be drawn upon.
First, the effectiveness of inter-regional competition will depend on a constitutional
framework that can only be provided by the central political institution. This should include
not only basic human rights, but also economic rights such as the free movement of
people, goods, and money throughout Russia. In addition, there are also areas such as
the legal system and macroeconomic policy where inter-regional differences in
preferences are probably small, and which may therefore be delegated to the centre to
avoid duplication of effort.
Second, an economic case may be made for requiring all regions to share in the financial
burdens resulting from Russia's communist past. Apart from economic considerations,
there is also the possibility of political upheaval if powerful groups stand to suffer
excessive income losses. In all likelihood, burden-sharing will require a substantial inter-
regional redistribution of income that may well have to be organized through the centre.
Third, an institutional framework should be created that takes into account the existing
inter-regional differences in political preferences and in the need for inter-regional
cooperation. It seems advisable, conceptually, to reconstruct the federal system from
bottom to top, and to allocate responsibilities to the centre only if this is in the interest of a
very large majority of regions. More limited inter-regional cooperation that involves only
sub-groups of regions may occur through specialized supra-regional, medium-level
government institutions that are controlled by the participating regions.
On a cautionary note, we emphasize that the complexity of the current situation does not
lend itself to sweeping generalizations. Competition among regions in the framework of a
confederation might well leave many Russian citizens worse off than they would be if
there were a central government with bureaucrats whose objective function contained only
the common good. Such a point of reference, however, is clearly irrelevant. Under present
circumstances, formally acknowledging the decentralization that has already taken place,
1
6 Even under the former, "bureaucratic market" system of intermediation (Naishul, 1993) regional elites
have long wielded effective power, although this was not obvious in terms of formal institutions.18
and giving regions well-defined responsibilities and sources of income offers the best
hope of regaining the momentum of economic reform. Relieving the centre of
responsibilities that are best born by the regions should also free administrative capacity
for those tasks that only central institutions can take care of adequately.19
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April 1993 referendum (per cent of votes cast). - ECSO93: support for the economic and social policies of the Russian
government in April 1993 referendum (per cent of votes cast). - ELPR93: support for early elections for the presidency (per cent of registered voters). -
ELPA93: support for early elections for the parliament (per cent of registered voters)
PRHS) obtained at least as man
- DEMOCRD: equal to 1 if democratic parties (VR, RDDR, Ytbloko.
y votes as conservative parties (LDPR, KPRF, Agrarian Party RF) in December 1993 parliamentary elect
equal to 1 if majority of voters approved the new
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Source: Unpublished material provided by the Research Insitute of the Parliamentary Centre of the Russian
parliament; Goskomstat Rossii (1992).